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ABSTRACT 
Purpose- Oil and Gas Pipelines (OGPs) are the safest mode of transportation for petroleum products. Yet, 
OGPs are facing a massive range of safety, design and operational risks such as sabotage, design defects, 
corrosion, material ageing, poor quality, misuse and geological disasters. These risks have resulted in OGP 
project management becoming more challenging and complex, particularly in developing countries with 
poor security systems. Additionally, there are two significant problems associated with OGP projects in 
these countries. The first is the different characteristics of risk factors, and the second is the real shortage of 
historical data required for any risk evaluation study. These problems mean that the currently accessible risk 
evolution methods cannot evaluate OGPs risk factors accurately. This paper aims to provide a proper 
understanding of the characteristics of OGPs risk factors in these countries. It also aims to identify the 
critical risk factors and their degree of probability and severity in pipeline projects, to avoid the loss of life 
and increased costs that result from risks to safety.  
Methodology- A quantitative research approach is adopted in this paper. Additionally, an industry survey 
was conducted by using a semi-structured questionnaire. The questionnaire was distributed online amongst 
the people who are associated with OGP projects in Iraq. SPSS 23 was used to analyse a total of 180 
successful questionnaire responses. The survey findings in terms of critical risk factors and their ranking in 
order of risk index of severity and probability are presented in tables and graphs. 
Findings- A total of 30 risk factors associated with OGP projects have been identified as critical risk factors 
and ranked them into a scale of probability and severity index. Third-party disruption (such as terrorism, 
theft and sabotage) was found to be the most critical safety risk factor whereas the failure form pipe 
corrosion was ranked the top most operational risk. 
Implications- The list of OPG critical safety and operational risk factors provides the first-stage findings. 
These findings will be implemented to develop a conceptual framework and a computer-based model for 
OGPs risk management system at the next stage of the research.  
Keywords: Oil and gas pipelines; risk factors; probability; severity; risk management; safety risk; 
operational risks and terrorism and sabotage. 
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1. Introduction
Oil and gas pipelines (OGPs) are some of the most important and significant critical infrastructures for any 
country because they are the safest and most economical mode of transportation for petroleum products. 
However, the number of accidents and the vast range of problems associated with them have severe 
consequences for the pipelines (Cunha, 2016). Compared to safe countries, pipeline disruption is a cause for 
concern in developing countries with low levels of security because of internal wars and terrorist 
organisations. This hazardous environment often results in malicious terrorist attacks on OGPs and makes 
their risk management more challenging and complex. The main risk factors for a long-distance OGPs 
include the following four factors: third-party disruption (TPD), misuse, corrosion damage and design flaws 
(Guo et al., 2016). The term ‘third-party role’ refers to pipelines being accidentally damaged by employees, 
natural phenomena such as soil movement (landslides, mudslides, foundation collapse and floods), and 
surface load (caused by blasting construction, illegal buildings compressing pipelines and ground live loads) 
(Peng et al., 2016). Similarly, Muhlbauer (2004) has defined TPD as any direct or indirect action against the 
infrastructure that is taken individually or by a group in order to obstruct the functionality of the 
infrastructures system. In this study, TPD refers to all individuals, organisations and mechanical tools that 
cause expected and/or accidental damage to the pipelines during different project stages. Consequently, 
proper attention needs to be given to pipeline disruption problems, because neglecting this critical issue has 
resulted in the disruption of business activity, grave casualties, the expenditure of time and efforts, and 
economic losses in the oil and gas industry. 
Preventing or preparing for something unexpected is almost impossible since nobody knows when or how a 
crisis will occur, or what will be affected by it (Labaka et al., 2016). Pipeline failures cannot be entirely 
avoided. Nevertheless, an appropriate and accurate risk evaluation method can contribute in providing 
reasonable and effectual risk management measures to reduce the overall risk of failure (Guo et al., 2016). 
For that reason, adequate facilities like ‘risk registration’ and ‘risk assessment’ are essential for the risk 
factor analysis procedure (Whipple and Pitblado, 2009). Evidently, historical records are a valuable 
information source for risk management studies (Ruijsscher, 2016). Unfortunately, the above-mentioned 
necessary facilities and databases are not available in developing countries, especially troubled ones, which 
is making it more challenging and demanding to obtain accurate risk evaluation methods for OGPs risk 
evaluation. 
Rest of the paper is organised as follows. Problem statement, objective of the paper, literature review, 




Dealing with OGPs risk factors as the most severe risks is resulting in a great deal of wasteful expenditure
and effort (Srivastava and Gupta, 2010). In addition, risk analysis requires a proper knowledge-base and
database (Prochazkova, 2010) and real-time data (Balfe et al., 2014) which can provide a verified level of
input in the successful development of a risk registry. Risk registers should contain all analysed risks in
order to prioritise the areas that require managerial attention and present the risk management profile
(Filippina and Dreherb, 2004; Whipple and Pitblado, 2009). Although accurate failure probability and
severity values are required, these values are still imprecise, deficient and vague (Khakzad et al., 2011). The
probability of TPD risk factors and the similar failure model cannot be calculated by using currently
available analytical methods because the historical failure data have not been established yet (Peng et al.,
2016; Ge et al., 2015). Unfortunately, authentic OGPs risk evaluation studies are unachievable as long as
the (1) knowledge, (2) essential data, (3) real-time inputs, (4) factor identification facilities and (5) factor
probabilities evaluation are not at the required level. These five critical problems are associated with OGP
projects in developing and troubled countries and are obstructing risk analysis efforts. Therefore, there is a
vital and urgent need for beneficial OGPs risk analytical studies and risk management tools that can identify
and rank the OGPs risk factors and contribute to solving these five diagnosed problems.
3. OBJECTIVE OF THE PAPER
This article aims to identify OGPs critical risk factors in countries where pipeline projects are suffering
severe consequences from terrorism and sabotage attacks in addition to other risk factors. It also aims to
provide a good understating about the characteristics of risk in these countries, and to rank the factors in
order of their probability and the severity of their effect on the pipeline. Furthermore, the intention is to
provide real input data and to overcome the problem of the shortage of available data. This paper will
prepare a table that shows the risk factors and their probability, severity, index and ranking. A risk table that
identifies the risk factors and deals with the individual impact of each risk is the first and most fundamental
step for any risk evaluation and assessment procedure. This table could help decision-makers, policy-makers
and researchers to understand the nature of OGPs risk management in hazardous environments and
circumstances. A proper understanding of risk factors can contribute to the adoption of a sustainable risk
management strategy during the different stages of OGP projects. Most importantly, accurate results of
numerical risk analysis will provide a basis for designing a computer-based model that could be
implemented to reduce OGPs risk management challenges and complexity. Iraq is one of a number of
troubled, developing countries, and it is the case study in this paper. As this is the first study in the country,




Data about pipeline failures during the project's planning, design, construction, operation and maintenance 
stages have been examined from different countries around the world in order to identify the critical risk 
factors associated with OGP projects. This comprehensive data review has been carried out to ensure that 
the risk factors involved in this research will provide valuable knowledge about OGPs risks in various 
environments and circumstances. It will also make the research’s results suitable for and applicable to many 
countries and will overcome the crucial problem of the shortage of available data and historical records in 
developing countries like Iraq. As a summary, Table 1 addresses the most common OGPs risk factors 
worldwide. This table will be used later on in the research to analyse the risk factors’ probability and 
severity through a quantitative research approach and a questionnaire. 
Table 1: Critical risk factors from reviewed articles 
Risk Factors Author 
Public's low legal and moral 
awareness 
Li et al. (2016) and Peng et al. (2016). 
Socio-political factors such as 
poverty and education level 
Nnadi et al. (2014), Mubin and Mubin, (2008), Guo 
et al. (2016), Anifowose et al. (2012) and Onuoha, 
(2008). 
Thieves Nnadi et al. (2014) and Onuoha, (2008). 
Terrorism and sabotage Nnadi et al. (2014), Mubin and Mubin, (2008), 
Dawotola et al. (2010), Dawotola et al. (2009), Lu 
et al. (2015), Anifowose et al. (2012) and Onuoha, 
(2008). 
Threats to staff (kidnap and/or 
murder) 
Rowland (2011). 
Leakage of sensitive information Srivastava and Gupta (2010) and Wu et al. (2015). 
Geographical location like ‘Hot-
Zones’ 
Srivastava and Gupta (2010). 
Conflicts over land ownership Mather et al. (2001) and Macdonald and Cosham 
(2005). 
Accessibility of pipelines Srivastava and Gupta (2010). 
Geological risks like erosion, soil 
movement and landslides   
Mubin and Mubin (2008), Guo et al. (2016) and 
Riegert (2011). 
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Vehicle accidents Peng et al. (2016) 
Animal accidents Rowland (2011) and Mubin and Mubin (2008). 
Lack of compliance with the safety 
regulations 
Nnadi et al. (2014) and Guo et al. (2016). 
Non-availability of warning signs Guo et al. (2016) and Kabir et al. (2015). 
Sabotage opportunities arising due to 
the exposed pipeline, e.g. above-
ground pipeline 
Rowland (2011). 
Lack of regular inspection and 
proper maintenance 
Balfe et al. (2014), Nnadi et al. (2014), Guo et al. 
(2016), Lu et al. (2015), Wu et al. (2015) and 
Anifowose et al. (2012). 
Inadequate risk management 
methods 
Balfe et al. (2014) and Nnadi et al. (2014). 
Natural disasters and weather 
conditions 
Nnadi et al. (2014), Mubin and Mubin (2008), 
Anifowose et al. (2012) and Onuoha (2008). 
Shortage of high-quality IT services 
and modern equipment 
Nnadi et al. (2014) and Mubin and Mubin (2008). 
Weak ability to identify and monitor 
the threats 
Nnadi et al. (2014) 
Corrosion: lack of cathodic 
protection and anticorrosive coating 
Nnadi et al. (2014), Guo et al. (2016), Dawotola et 
al. (2010), Dawotola et al. (2009), Lu et al.( 2015), 
Wu et al. (2015), Riegert, (2011) and Sulaiman and 
Tan (2014).  
Design, construction, material and 
manufacturing defects 
Guo et al. (2016), Dawotola et al. (2010), Dawotola 
et al. (2009), Lu et al. (2015), Wu et al. (2015), 
Riegert (2011) and Sulaiman and Tan (2014). 
Operational errors like human errors 
and equipment failure  
Balfe et al. (2014), Nnadi et al. (2014), Mubin and 
Mubi, (2008), Guo et al. (2016), Dawotola et al. 
(2010), Dawotola et al. (2009), Lu et al. (2015) and 
Wu et al. (2015). 
Hacker attacks on the operating or 
control system 
Srivastava and Gupta (2010). 
The law does not apply to saboteurs Peng et al. (2016) and Mubin and Mubin (2008). 
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Stakeholders are not paying proper 
attention 
Nnadi et al., (2014). 
Few researchers are dealing with this 
problem 
Nnadi et al. (2014). 
Lack of historical records about 
accidents and lack of risk registration 
Balfe et al. (2014) and Nnadi et al. (2014). 
Lack of proper training schemes Balfe et al. (2014) and Nnadi et al. (2014). 
Corruption Nnadi et al. (2014). 
5. METHODOLOGY
5.1. Questionnaire Survey Development 
Because risk factors are characteristically uncertain, vague and random, risk models can accommodate a 
more personal style of thinking, cognition and processing capability (Guo et al., 2016). This research is 
engaged with people who are in touch with the OGPs problem and, most importantly, it wants to obtain a 
consensus view and perception that reflects the reality of OGPs risk factors as far as possible (Sa’idi et al., 
2014). A questionnaire survey is utilised because it is one of the most widely used methods for additional 
data collecting. A semi-structured questionnaire survey was designed and distributed online to OGPs 
stakeholders in Iraq. The questionnaire has been designed based on the findings of the risk factors’ data 
review (Table 1). The questionnaire’s purpose is to evaluate the risk factors’ probability and severity based 
on the real knowledge and expertise of the OGPs stakeholders. 
The survey was conducted using the ‘SoGoSurvey’ website. A snowball sampling technique was used for 
recruiting respondents from government and private agencies who have relevant experience with OGP 
projects, for example, consultants, planners, designers, construction workers, operators, maintenance 
workers, administrators, owners, clients and researchers. An online or Internet questionnaire survey has 
been adopted in this research because it is easy to manage, inexpensive and a quick data collection method 
(Dolnicar et al., 2009). However, online surveys have some limitations or disadvantages, such as Internet 
accessibility might not be available for the targeted sample, web security issues regarding anonymity and 
knowledge about the website, and computer literacy. These disadvantages could result in a low response 
rate (Czaja and Blair, 2005). On other side, researchers like Czaja and Blair (2005) and Bertot (2009) have 
concluded from different international samples that the online survey is the easiest form of data collection 
and real cooperation is provided via open-ended questions.  
The final data collection instrument consisted of 12 questions divided into three sections with 95 items in 
total. Before carrying out the main survey, a pilot survey was conducted, and all ambiguous questions were 
revised or discarded to improve clarity. The study utilised different response formats, including drop-down, 
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multiple-choice and open-ended questions. This article discusses question numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
Questions 1, 2 and 3 ask about each participant’s occupation, experience and degree of education 
respectively. Six choices are listed in the first question for participants to select their occupation in relation 
to OGP projects. Likewise, four choices are listed in the second and third questions to describe the 
participants’ experience and degree of education. Questions 4 and 5 were included to understand the 
stakeholders’ perception about the risk factors’ probability and severity. The 30 risk factors listed in these 
two questions have been identified previously in Table 1. These questions were designed as multi-choice 
questions by using a five-point Likert scale from 5 to 1. Question number 4 was about ranking the risk 
factors in order of probability of occurrence, where 5 means almost certain, 4 means likely, 3 means 
possible, 2 means unlikely, and finally 1 means rare; whereas question number 5 was about ranking the risk 
factors in order of severity on the OGPs, where 5 means catastrophic, 4 means major, 3 means moderate, 2 
means minor and lastly 1 means negligible. Figure 1 and Table 3 represent the statistical analysis results for 
these questions.  
5.2. Survey Sampling and Data Collection  
There is a need in any survey to select the right sample from the targeted population. This is because, in 
general, questionnaire surveys create many non-respondents, therefore getting the right people to participate 
is extremely important. As mentioned previously, the snowball sampling technique is utilised in this 
research to ensure widespread distribution of the survey (Dragan and Maniu, 2013; Ameen and Mourshed, 
2016) among OGPs Iraqi stockholders. This technique works as follows: the survey is initially distributed 
by the authors to a number of previously identified participants, who forward it to others, and so forth until 
the required number of responses is reached (Ameen and Mourshed, 2016). This technique can help to 
collect data from a large number of participants. The survey was started on 26th of February 2017 by 
sending the online link to potential participants via social networks. The survey closed on the 16th of March 
2017 with a total of 180 responses. 
5.3. Data Analysis   
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 23 (SPSS 23) is used to calculate the Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient factor (α) to assess the questionnaire’s reliability. The α measures the reliability and the internal 
consistency or average correlation of the survey items (Cronbach, 1951; Webb et al., 2006; Ameen and 
Mourshed, 2016). Depending on the scale’s nature and purpose, different levels of reliability are required; 
Pallant (2005) recommends 0.7 as a minimum reliability level. Table 2 shows the α of the questionnaire and 
the paper’s related items.  
SPSS 23 is used to analyse the questionnaire statistically. The statistical frequency analysis for each item in 
questions 1 to 3 has been performed as shown in Figure 1. As stated previously in this paper, a scale from 5 
to 1 was assumed for questions 4 and 5 to score each risk factor’s probability and degree of impact, where 5 
means the most ‘extreme’ risk probability or severity and 1 the ‘lowest’. In order to determine each factor’s 
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probability and severity, the chosen items are analysed by using the descriptive statistics analysis method to 
calculate the factors’ frequencies summation and means. Then, the total score of RI for each factor is 
mathematically calculated by using equation 1 (Hill, 1993; Chamzini, 2014; Sa’idi et al., 2014).   
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸 = (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)/5                                                                                                             … (1) 
Where: RI is risk index, RP is risk probability, and RS is risk severity. The risk factors’ probability, severity 
and index have been ranked depending on their value. Table 3 presents the probability, severity, index and 
ranking for each risk factor.   
6. RESULTS
6.1. Reliability and Validity 
As mentioned earlier, SPSS 23 has been used to examine the questionnaire’s reliability and calculate the 
Cronbach’s alpha. The results are presented in Table 2.   









N % N % N % 
All of the 
questionnaire 
items 
180 100 0 0 100 0 95 0.909 
Questions No. 4 
and 5 
180 100 0 0 100 0 60 0.926 
Question No. 4 180 100 0 0 100 0 30 0.918 
Question No. 5 180 100 0 0 100 0 30 0.863 
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure (SPSS 23). 
6.2. Participants’ Demographic Data 
One hundred and eighty responders successfully answered the questionnaire’s questions. Figure 1 provides 
their demographic information such as occupation, experience and educational degree level.   
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The question 1 frequency analysis results indicate that the biggest group of participants is the construction 
workers group, with 60 responders and 33.3% of the total 180 responders. This is followed by the other 
groups, in this order: the operators group, with 39 responders and 21.7%; the researchers group, with 31 
responders and 17.2%; the administrators group, with 26 responders and 14.4 %; the consultants, planners 
and designers group, with 14 responders and 7.8%; and, lastly, the owners and clients group, with 10 
responders and 5.6%. Similarly, question 2 results indicate that most of the participants have less than five 
years of experience, with a total of 63 responders and 35% in this category. The participants with 5-10, 10-
15, and more than 15 years of experience follow, with 62 responders and 34.4%; 28 responders and 15.6%; 
and 27 responders and 15% respectively. In question 3, the Bachelor’s or Higher Diploma degree holders 
form the majority of the participants, with 96 responders and 53.3%. The Master’s and PhD degree holders 
are next, with 56 responders and 31.1%, followed by the High School or Diploma degree holders, with 25 
responders and 13.9%; and last is Vocational, with three responders and 1.7%. 
6.3. Risk Probability, Severity, Index and Ranking 
The values of RP, RS and RI and the risk ranking have been found using SPSS 23 statistical analysis 
facilities, as shown in Table 3.  
Table 3 Risks’ probability, severity, index and ranking 
Risk Factors 
















728 4.044 1 814 4.522 1 3.658 1 
Corruption 720 4 2 778 4.322 2 3.458 2 




673 3.739 4 739 4.106 5 3.070 4 
The law does not 
apply to saboteurs 
653 3.628 12 751 4.172 3 3.027 5 
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Corrosion and lack of 
protection against it 
668 3.711 6 712 3.956 6 2.936 6 
Improper safety 
regulations 
666 3.7 7 707 3.928 8 2.907 7 
Public's low legal 
and moral awareness 
669 3.717 5 692 3.844 11 2.858 8 
Improper inspection 
and maintenance 
658 3.656 10 703 3.906 9 2.856 9 
Weak ability to 
identify and monitor 
the threats 
658 3.656 11 699 3.883 10 2.839 10 
Stakeholders are not 
paying proper 
attention 
642 3.567 18 712 3.956 7 2.822 11 
Lack of proper 
training 
650 3.611 16 675 3.750 13 2.708 12 
Sabotage 
opportunities arising 
due to the exposed 
pipeline, e.g. above-
ground pipeline 
661 3.672 8 662 3.678 16 2.701 13 
Limited warning 
signs 
651 3.617 15 660 3.667 17 2.652 14 
Shortage of IT 
services and modern 
equipment 
661 3.672 9 650 3.611 19 2.652 15 
Lack of historical 
records about 
accidents and lack of 
risk registration 
644 3.578 17 667 3.706 15 2.652 16 
The pipeline is easy 
to access 
651 3.617 14 659 3.661 18 2.648 17 
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Few researchers are 
dealing with this 
problem 
652 3.622 13 645 3.583 20 2.596 18 
Design, construction 
and material defects 
598 3.322 22 687 3.817 12 2.536 19 
Conflicts over land 
ownership 
627 3.483 19 644 3.578 21 2.492 20 
Threats to staff 598 3.322 21 668 3.711 14 2.466 21 
Socio-political 
factors such as 
poverty and 
education level 
621 3.45 20 612 3.400 24 2.346 22 
Operational errors 554 3.078 24 642 3.567 22 2.196 23 
Inadequate risk 
management 
579 3.217 23 604 3.356 25 2.159 24 
Leakage of sensitive 
information 
535 2.972 25 628 3.489 23 2.074 25 
Geological risks such 
as groundwater and 
landslides 
492 2.733 26 574 3.189 26 1.743 26 
Natural disasters and 
weather conditions 
473 2.628 27 546 3.033 27 1.594 27 
Vehicle accidents 437 2.428 28 486 2.700 29 1.311 28 
Hacker attacks on the 
operating or control 
system 
401 2.228 29 524 2.911 28 1.297 29 
Animal accidents 337 1.872 30 365 2.028 30 0.759 30 
a 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 =  ∑(5 − 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦 × 5 + 4 − 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦 × 4 + 3 − 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦 × 3 + 2 − 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦 ×2 + 1 − 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦 × 1) 
b 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 = 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑁𝑁� =  𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑁𝑁�  Where N= number of participants = 180 and c Equation 1.
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7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
7.1. Discussion
Along with a comprehensive and in-depth literature review, the stakeholders' perceptions are vital and
valuable in identifying the OGPs problems. This is because stakeholders' perceptions are based on their real
experience in the OGPs context, which makes them qualified to monitor the existing problems of TPD. For
that reason, it is expected that the questionnaire survey results will provide a kind of database for OGPs risk
factors in the country of study, Iraq.
The questionnaire data are reliable because all α values are above 0.7, as shown in Table 2. The
demographic information about the 180 responders reflects the diversity of the successfully collected
sample, as shown in Figure 1. This decent level of diversity means the questionnaire has definitely reached
the targeted population because all the categories are represented in the survey. Proper sampling reflects the
identification of more realistic risk factors, and enhances the final results. In other words, it provides the
verified and valuable data required for the risk factor evaluation process.
In this paper, 30 risk factors have been investigated and ranked on a five-point Likert scale from 5-1.
Overall, the probability analysis of these factors indicates that the most frequent factors were terrorism and
sabotage (mean= 4.044), corruption (mean= 4.000), thieves (mean= 3.744), hot-zones (mean= 3.739) and
the public's low awareness (mean= 3.717). Geological (mean= 2.733), natural disasters (mean= 2.628),
vehicle accidents (mean= 2.428), hackers (mean= 2.228) and animal accidents (mean= 1.872) were the less
frequent factors. In the same way, the risk factors were ranked regarding the severity degree. The factors’
severity ranking shows that the most severe risks were terrorism and sabotage (mean= 4.522), corruption
(mean= 4.322), the law does not apply to saboteurs (mean= 4.172), thieves (mean= 4.106) and hot-zones
(mean= 4.106). On the other side, the geological risks (mean= 3.189), natural disasters (mean= 3.033),
hackers (mean= 2.911), vehicle accidents (mean= 2.700) and animal accidents (mean= 2.028) were the less
severe factors. The RI values highlight the hazardous risk factors. The factors with the highest impact on the
pipeline projects were terrorism and sabotage (RI= 3.658), corruption (RI= 3.458), thieves (RI= 3.074), hot-
zones (RI= 3.070) and the law does not apply to saboteurs (RI= 3.027). Geological risks (RI= 1.743),
natural disasters and weather conditions (RI= 1.594), vehicle accidents (RI= 1.311), hacker attacks (RI=
1.297) and animal accidents (RI= 0.759) were the factors that had less impact. Table 3 has shown the risk
factors’ probability, severity, index and ranking.
In this paper, the 30 risk factors have been classified into five groups, namely: security and social factors;
pipeline location factors; health, safety and environment (HSE) factors; operational factors; and rules and
regulations factors. For the security and social factors, terrorism and sabotage factors are always at the top
of the most influencing factors ranking list. They are followed by thefts; public's low legal and moral
awareness; threats to staff; socio-political factors such as poverty and education level; and leakage of
sensitive information. Amongst the risk factors related to the pipeline’s location, it has been found that hot-
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zones are the most risky and accidents due to animal crossing are the least. Meanwhile, easy access to the 
pipeline; conflicts over land ownership; geological risk; and vehicle accidents are the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th 
ranking factors respectively. HSE factors are ranked as follows: improper safety regulations; inadequate 
inspection and maintenance; the pipelines are exposed and above the ground; limited warning signs; risk 
management nature character; and, last of all, natural disaster and weather conditions. Corrosion and the 
lack of protection against it are the major operational issues facing the pipes. This is followed by weak 
ability to monitor the risk factors; limited availability of IT; design, construction and material defects; and 
operational error, which are the 2Pnd P, 3PrdP, 4PthP and 5Pth P issues respectively. Problems caused by hacker attacks on 
the operating or control system have the least impact on the pipeline system in Iraq. The group of risk 
factors related to the rules and regulations have been evaluated as follows: corruption and the law does not 
apply to saboteurs and thieves are the factors with the highest impact among this type of risk. The rest of the 
rules and regulations factors are ranked as follows: stakeholders are not paying proper attention; lack of 
proper training; lack of an accident database and historical records; and, lastly, few researchers looking into 
this subject. 
The top five risk factors in Table 3 indicate that the Iraqi OGPs stakeholders are most increasingly 
concerned with security and social issues; rules and regulations; and the pipelines’ geographical locations, 
because terrorist and theft acts have become respectively the first and third most pressing factors facing 
OGPs in Iraq. Additionally, corruption is the second top risk factor, and the law does not apply to saboteurs 
and thieves is the fourth, both of which are obstructing pipeline projects in Iraq. Hot-zones are fifth in this 
top five list, and so are also a cause for concern.   
7.2. Conclusion 
OGP projects are complex and risky; the risk management challenges are increasing day by day due to the 
vast range of problems facing pipeline projects and the insecure global environment. Balfe et al. (2014) 
stated that, in order to maintain safe and secure construction and operation circumstances, monitoring 
studies must be continuously conducted, and translated into formats that can be reviewed, understood and 
analysed. For that reason, this article has been written to represent the final outcomes of this research.  
Common OGPs risk factors have been identified based on an extensive review of the causes of pipeline 
failure around the word. A quantitative research approach has been adopted to evaluate the 30 identified 
factors. The probability and severity of risk factors have been determined based on the statistical analysis 
results of a questionnaire survey with a total of 180 respondents. The RI for each factor was mathematically 
calculated to rank the risk factors in relation to their degree of influence on OGPs. Their ranking indicates 
that terrorism and sabotage acts, corruption, hot-zones and the law is not applied to saboteurs are the risks 
that have the highest impact on OGPs. On the other side, geological hazards, natural disasters and weather 
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conditions, vehicle accidents, hacker attacks and animal accidents are the factors with the least impact. TPD 
risks occupied the top positions in the ranked list of OGP risk factors. Furthermore, the prioritised risk 
factors showed an essential need to understand the profile of TPD in Iraqi OGP projects. TPD should be an 
important focus for management in order to mitigate and limit damage to pipelines. 
The research’s findings could support decision-makers, policy-makers and researchers to understand the 
nature of TPD to OGPs properly in troubled countries like Iraq. A ranked list of risk factors could help to 
provide more active and suitable risk management methods to avoid or minimise the adverse impact of risks 
in OGP projects. Precisely, OGPs stakeholders could use the outcomes (presented in tables 1 and 3) as a 
database and tools for risk evaluation at different stages of a pipeline project. T findings could also be used 
for monitoring and prioritising risks during design, re-design, construction, operation, inspection and 
maintenance activities. Respectively, these numerical results will be adopted to develop a new computer-
based model for OGPs risk management at the next stage of the research. 
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